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NOTE
Picking Winners and Losers: The
Subjectivity of Missouri Disciplinary
Decisions
In re Krigel, 480 S.W.3d 294 (Mo. 2016) (en banc)

Bradley Craigmyle*

I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine someone close to you unexpectedly impregnates his girlfriend.
He wants to raise the child and does not want to put the baby up for adoption,
but the mother feels adoption is best. To facilitate the adoption process, the
mother hires a lawyer. This lawyer intentionally keeps the father and the father’s attorney in the dark regarding the adoption proceedings. The mother
then, under her lawyer’s guidance, gives false testimony at a court hearing so
the child can be adopted. The father – who had been misled about the baby’s
due date and deprived of custody for over one year – eventually learns of the
child’s birth and intervenes in the adoption proceedings. Imagine further that
the lawyer who orchestrated the plan to deceive the father and separate him
from his child never loses his law license. Would you feel satisfied with this
outcome? Would this strike you as the appropriate discipline? Or would you
expect justice to take another form? While this might seem like a far-fetched
hypothetical, it was a harsh reality for at least one Missourian not long ago.
The American Bar Association (“ABA”) provides a guide for state-level
ethics laws known as the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model
Rules”). The Supreme Court of Missouri adopts ethics laws (“Missouri
Rules”) and disciplines lawyers who violate these laws.1 One of a lawyer’s

*

B.A., Truman State University, 2014; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School
of Law, 2017; Editor in Chief, Missouri Law Review, 2016–2017. I owe many thanks
to the Missouri Law Review editing and footnote folks for their hard work and thoughtful feedback. All remaining errors are mine alone.
1. The Missouri Rules are the substantive equivalent of the Model Rules. See
MO. SUP. CT. R. 4-8.5(a) (“A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject
to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction regardless of where the lawyer’s conduct occurs. A lawyer not admitted in this jurisdiction is also subject to the disciplinary
authority of this jurisdiction if the lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal services in this jurisdiction. A lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority of both
this jurisdiction and other jurisdictions for the same conduct.”).
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most fundamental duties is exercising honesty toward the tribunal, and the Missouri Rules prohibit a lawyer from engaging in dishonest behavior before tribunals.2
This Note traces the facts and holding of the case In re Krigel, before
delving into the ABA’s influential role in legal ethics. Next, it outlines Missouri’s attorney discipline procedures and analyzes pertinent Missouri case
law. Lastly, this Note critiques the majority opinion and argues that Krigel
should have been disbarred.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In response to several alleged violations of the Missouri Rules, the Office
of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel (“OCDC”) adopted the Disciplinary Hearing
Panel’s (“DHP”) recommendation and sought suspension of Sanford P. Krigel’s law license.3 Krigel objected to the DHP’s recommendation and asked
the Supreme Court of Missouri to dismiss the OCDC’s Information (Missouri’s
charging document).4
Krigel became a member of The Missouri Bar in 1976.5 In 1978, he began
practicing law with his wife, and their firm employs eleven attorneys.6 He
specializes in adoption law and, before this incident, had no record of disciplinary action.7 The conduct at issue stemmed from Krigel’s representation of an
“unmarried, pregnant, eighteen year old woman” (“Birth Mother”) in 2009.8
Initially, Birth Mother and Birth Father agreed to hide the unexpected pregnancy from their parents until Birth Mother was eight months pregnant.9 During their meeting with both parents to discuss the pregnancy, Birth Father asserted that he wanted to raise the child and did not want to give it up for adoption.10 The birth parents’ relationship deteriorated because of this meeting, and
Birth Mother’s parents tried to prevent Birth Father from contacting Birth
Mother.11
Birth Father hired attorney Jeff Zimmerman to assist him with Birth
Mother’s pregnancy.12 Concurrently, Birth Mother asked Hillary Merryfield,
2. Id. R. 4-3.3(a) (prohibiting lawyers from knowingly presenting “a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal”).
3. In re Krigel, 480 S.W.3d 294, 298–99 (Mo. 2016) (en banc).
4. Id. at 299.
5. Id. at 296.
6. Sanford P. Krigel, KRIGEL & KRIGEL L. OFFS., https://www.krigelandkrigel.com/people/sanford-p-krigel/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2017); Our People: Attorneys,
KRIGEL & KRIGEL L. OFFS., https://www.krigelandkrigel.com/section/attorney/ (last
visited Jan. 29, 2017).
7. Krigel, 480 S.W.3d at 296–97.
8. Id. at 297.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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who runs a child placement agency, for an attorney referral.13 Merryfield and
Krigel had worked together on adoptions for around twenty years, and she recommended Krigel to Birth Mother.14 Krigel met with Birth Mother on March
11, 2010, and Birth Mother explained that she felt it would be best to give the
child up for adoption.15 She also informed Krigel that Birth Father would not
consent to an adoption.16 Birth Mother retained Krigel to counsel her in terminating her parental rights in preparation for an adoption.17 Krigel implemented
a “passive strategy,” whereby they “would actively do nothing to communicate
with Birth Father or his counsel; they would not advise Birth Father or his
counsel of the adoption plans, the birth of the child, and the instigation of any
legal proceedings.”18
On March 19, 2010, Zimmerman called Krigel and suggested that the
birth parents receive counseling outside their parents’ presence.19 Already
knowing Birth Mother was working with Merryfield seeking an adoption, Krigel proposed the birth parents meet with Merryfield.20 During this call, Krigel
told Zimmerman the child would not be adopted without the Birth Father’s
consent.21 After meeting with the birth parents, Merryfield reported to Krigel
that Birth Father did not want to consent to an adoption, but she believed that
Birth Father would not contest the adoption because she felt he was “quiet, sad,
and passive.”22
Birth Mother contacted Birth Father in late March – intending to deceive
him – and falsely claimed that her due date had changed from early April to
early May.23 The child was born, and neither Birth Father nor Zimmerman was
informed.24 Next, Birth Mother attended a hearing in Jackson County, Missouri, to terminate her parental rights and move forward with the adoption on
April 6, 2010.25 Both Birth Father and Zimmerman failed to attend because
neither was aware of the hearing.26 Responding to Krigel’s question at the
hearing, Birth Mother agreed that “Birth Father had been consulted at length
about the matter.”27 Krigel also asked Birth Mother: “[E]ven though you’ve
talked to him and his family at some length, he has not stepped forward since

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 297–98 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 298.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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the birth of the child claiming any rights to the child”; and she agreed.28 The
court terminated Birth Mother’s parental rights and transferred custody to the
prospective adoptive parents.29 Birth Father intervened in the adoption proceedings after learning of the child’s birth, and the trial court awarded legal
and physical custody to Birth Father on May 6, 2011.30
The OCDC filed an Information against Krigel in 2014, and the DHP
(discussed below) conducted an evidentiary hearing – it recommended suspending Krigel indefinitely, without leave to apply for reinstatement, for six
months.31 The OCDC (Missouri’s investigative disciplinary body) accepted
the recommendation, but Krigel did not – believing no sanctions should be imposed – and appealed to the Supreme Court of Missouri.32 The Supreme Court
of Missouri found that Krigel violated the Missouri Rules, specifically Rules
4-3.3(a)(3) (knowingly offering false evidence), 4-4.1(a) (making a false statement of material fact), 4-4.4(a) (improperly burdening or delaying a third person), and 4-8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).33 The court stayed Krigel’s suspension, subject to his completion of two
years’ probation, according to court-imposed conditions.34

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Lawyers, as professionals, must exercise a high degree of skill and care,
and ethical behavior is part of that skill and care.35 This Part looks at the ABA’s
function in articulating and enforcing legal ethics. Next, it analyzes Missouri’s
legal ethics laws and synthesizes Missouri case law that deals with Rule 43.3(a) violations, which involve lawyers who knowingly present false evidence. The court cited all of the cases discussed below in deciding Krigel’s
fate.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 298–99.
Id. at 299.
Id. at 296.
Id.
LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE
OF LAW 5 (4th ed. 2016).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss1/10

4

Craigmyle: Picking Winners and Losers

2017]

PICKING WINNERS AND LOSERS

173

A. The ABA’s Role in Legal Ethics
One of the ABA’s goals is to improve the legal profession.36 A related
objective is to “[p]romote competence, ethical conduct[,] and professionalism.”37 Against this backdrop, the ABA has helped develop the ethical framework governing lawyer behavior for over a century.38 In an effort to proactively encourage lawyers to act ethically, the ABA, in 1908, promulgated the
Canons of Professional Ethics (“Canons”).39 In 1969, the ABA replaced the
Canons with suggested disciplinary rules when it adopted the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility (“Model Code”).40 The ABA approved the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”) in 1983 to address some important problems lawyers were facing that the Model Code did not adequately
address.41 The ABA continues to revise and publish the Model Rules, and
while they are not law, the Model Rules have been very influential in most
states.42
Lawyer discipline is meant to serve three main functions. It aims to protect the public, ensure the administration of justice, and maintain the integrity
of the profession.43 The ABA promulgated the Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions (“Standards”) to increase disciplinary consistency in 1986.44 The
Standards instruct courts to consider the following when disciplining a lawyer:
(1) the duty violated, (2) the lawyer’s mental state, (3) the actual or potential
injury the lawyer’s misconduct caused, and (4) any aggravating or mitigating
factors.45 Aggravating factors relevant to Krigel’s case include: (1) multiple
offenses, (2) a refusal to acknowledge the conduct’s wrongful nature, and (3)
substantial experience practicing law.46 The only mitigating factor mentioned
in Krigel’s case was the absence of a prior disciplinary record.47
Model Rule 3.3(a) seeks to ensure candor toward the tribunal; it instructs
that a “lawyer shall not knowingly . . . offer evidence that the lawyer knows to
be false.”48 Further, a lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures if he,
his client, or his witness offers material evidence and the lawyer later learns

36. ABA
Mission
and
Goals,
ABA,
http://www.americanbar.org/about_the_aba/aba-mission-goals.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2017).
37. Id.
38. LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 35, at 36.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 37.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 21.
43. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Preface (AM. BAR ASS’N
1986).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 3.0.
46. Id. at 9.22.
47. Id. at 9.32.
48. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
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the evidence is false.49 If necessary, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal about
the false evidence.50 Under the Standards, generally, a lawyer should be disbarred if he intends to deceive the court in making a false statement or withholding material information and injures a party or adversely affects the legal
proceeding.51 For less serious violations, a lawyer should generally be suspended if he knows false statements are being submitted to the court, fails to
take remedial action, and a party is injured or the legal proceeding is adversely
affected.52
Model Rule 4.1 concerns truthfulness in statements to others, and it forbids a lawyer from knowingly making “a false statement of material fact or law
to a third person” in the course of representing a client.53 To comply with
Model Rule 4.4(a), a lawyer must not engage in behavior that has no substantial
purpose “other than to embarrass, delay, or burden” another person.54 Lastly,
a lawyer violates Model Rule 8.4(d) – and commits professional misconduct –
if he engages in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.55

B. Missouri Ethics Laws and Disciplinary Procedures
The Supreme Court of Missouri oversees the state’s lawyer disciplinary
system.56 The Missouri Rules govern The Missouri Bar, and Rules 4-3.3(a)(3),
4-4.1(a), 4-4.4(a), and 4-8.4(d) are functionally identical to the Model Rules
discussed above.57
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 6.11 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1986)

(emphasis added).
52. Id. at 6.12. Further,
Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent either in
determining whether statements or documents are false or in taking remedial action when material information is being withheld, and causes injury
or potential injury to a party to the legal proceeding, or causes an adverse
or potentially adverse effect on the legal proceeding.
Id. at 6.13.
53. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1(a).
54. Id. r. 4.4(a).
55. Id. r. 8.4(d). This rule has been described as “a kind of catch-all that exhorts
people to act honorable, without defining the behavior that could cause a lawyer to be
disciplined or even disbarred”; it applies to a “wide range of conduct.” LERMAN &
SCHRAG, supra note 35, at 739.
56. Disciplinary Information, MO. BAR, http://www.mobar.org/ethics/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2017).
57. Comparison of Newly Adopted Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct with
ABA Model Rules, ABA (Feb. 17, 2010), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/pic/miss.authcheckdam.pdf. The Missouri Rules numbering scheme follows closely the Model Rules, but because the Missouri Rules are part
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When a person believes a lawyer has acted unethically, she may file a
complaint with the OCDC, an office the Supreme Court of Missouri created to
investigate ethical complaints filed against lawyers.58 First, the OCDC screens
the complaint to ensure it deals with professional misconduct.59 Next, if the
complaint does involve professional misconduct, the OCDC may either refer
the complainant to the Complaint Resolution Program60 or “open” the complaint file.61 The OCDC or a Regional Disciplinary Committee (“RDC”) (local
committees comprised of lawyers and non-lawyers) investigates the opened
complaint.62 The investigation may include written investigation, telephone
calls, and personal interviews.63 Based on the investigation, the Chief Disciplinary Counsel (“CDC”) or RDC: (1) closes the file, (2) issues a written admonition, or (3) files an Information.64 The investigative body closes the file
if it finds no violation.65 If the investigative body believes the lawyer has committed a minor violation, it can issue a written admonition that becomes part of
the lawyer’s record.66 The investigative body will file an Information if it decides the lawyer committed a serious violation.67 The lawyer may request a
hearing on the Information within thirty days; otherwise, the Supreme Court of
Missouri imposes discipline by default.68
If the offending lawyer requests a hearing, the Advisory Committee (composed of lawyers and non-lawyers appointed by the Supreme Court of Missouri) assigns the case to a DHP (which includes two lawyers and one nonlawyer chosen from a larger panel appointed by the Supreme Court of Missouri).69 The DHP hears evidence and recommends one of the following: (1)
dismissal, (2) written admonition, (3) reprimand, or (4) suspension or disbarment.70 Either party may appeal the DHP’s recommendation to the Supreme

of Missouri Supreme Court Rule 4, Model Rule 1.0 is Supreme Court Rule 4-1.0 in
Missouri, and so on. See MO. SUP. CT. R. 4-1.0.
58. Disciplinary Information, supra note 56.
59. Id.
60. Id. (“In some instances it is appropriate to refer the complainant to the Complaint Resolution Program administered by The Missouri Bar or a fee dispute resolution
program. Local bar associations in St. Louis and Kansas City operate fee dispute resolution programs serving those areas, while The Missouri Bar administers such a program for the rest of the state.”).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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Court of Missouri.71 The parties may then brief and argue the issue before the
court makes a decision.72
The OCDC data from 2015 show: eighteen disbarments, twenty-seven
suspensions (eleven of which were stayed), four public reprimands, and eightythree written admonitions.73 Only nine cases were appealed and briefed to the
Supreme Court of Missouri, and of those nine, only five were heard because
the offending attorney disagreed with a DHP’s recommended sanction.74

C. Missouri Precedent
Sketching Missouri precedent is meant to serve two functions. First, doing so provides background on the cases the court cited – and presumably found
instructive – in deciding Krigel’s case. Second, due to the number of cases
discussed, it allows us to better understand the method with which the Supreme
Court of Missouri analyzes and decides disciplinary cases.
In the 1992 case In re Ver Dught, Ver Dught represented a client in her
appeal to an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) to receive Supplemental Security Income and Disabled Widow’s benefits.75 Ver Dught’s client remarried
before the ALJ hearing, and he advised the client not to reveal her married
name when testifying; Ver Dught then elicited false testimony.76 Ver Dught
referred to his client by her maiden name three times, despite being fully aware
that she had taken her new husband’s last name.77 Ver Dught also stated that
his client had only been married twice, even though Ver Dught knew his client
was currently married to her third husband.78 The Supreme Court of Missouri
found that Ver Dught: (1) knowingly made a false statement of material fact to
the tribunal, (2) failed to disclose to the tribunal a material fact when disclosure
was necessary to avoid assisting his client in a criminal or fraudulent act, (3)
offered evidence he knew was false, (4) engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, and (5) engaged in conduct prejudicial
to the administration of justice.79
Despite these missteps, the court distinguished Ver Dught’s actions from
those of a lawyer who is “demonstrably unfit to continue in the profession” and
did not disbar him.80 The court distinguished based on mitigating evidence that
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL, REPORT TOGETHER WITH THE

FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE TREASURER OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE FUND FOR 2015,
at 22 (May 2016), http://www.mochiefcounsel.org/articles/Annual%20Report%202015.pdf.
74. Id.
75. In re Ver Dught, 825 S.W.2d 847, 848 (Mo. 1992) (en banc).
76. Id. at 849–50.
77. Id. at 848–49.
78. Id. at 850.
79. Id. at 850–51.
80. Id.
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he contributed to his profession, community, and church, and that he possessed
a “good” reputation in the community.81 The court concluded Ver Dught’s
conduct did not warrant disbarment and instead suspended him for six
months.82
In 1994, the defendant in the case In re Oberhellmann was charged with
violating the Missouri Rules; the violations stemmed from his conduct in two
separate matters.83 In the first matter, Oberhellmann alleged that his client resided in Texas to establish diversity jurisdiction, but Oberhellmann knew his
client lived in Missouri.84 When answering interrogatories, Oberhellmann
used his mother’s Illinois address as his client’s.85 The client then followed
Oberhellmann’s instructions and lied at her deposition to corroborate the interrogatories; she claimed she lived with Dorothy Goode and claimed that Goode
was her cousin.86 Oberhellmann also told his client to avoid answering a question during her deposition if he tapped her foot or knee.87 The Supreme Court
of Missouri held Oberhellmann violated the Missouri Rules by: (1) knowingly
making a false statement of material fact, (2) counseling his client to give false
testimony, and (3) engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.88
In the second matter, Oberhellmann forged his former law partner’s signature on a motion to withdraw.89 The court found that he violated the Missouri Rules by: (1) knowingly making a false statement of material fact, (2)
engaging in conduct involving dishonestly, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation,
and (3) engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.90 The
court mentioned no mitigating factors and looked to the Standards and precedent in disbarring Oberhellmann because he knowingly made a false statement
and submitted a false document with the intent to deceive the court.91
In another 1994 case, In re Storment, the offending attorney counseled his
witness to testify falsely and asked questions on direct examination designed
to elicit the false testimony.92 After the witness gave surprising, and potentially
damaging, testimony, Storment requested a recess.93 The court reporter inadvertently left the tape recorder on, and it captured Storment telling the witness
to deny the damaging testimony.94 Storment further told the witness, “If you
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 851.
Id.
In re Oberhellmann, 873 S.W.2d 851, 853 (Mo. 1994) (en banc).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 854.
Id. at 855.
Id. at 855–56.
Id. at 856.
In re Storment, 873 S.W.2d 227, 229–30 (Mo. 1994) (en banc).
Id. at 228.
Id.
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said it didn’t happen, it didn’t happen.”95 The Supreme Court of Missouri
found that Storment: (1) knowingly failed to disclose a material fact necessary
to avoid assisting a client’s fraudulent act, (2) offered evidence he knew to be
false, (3) engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, and (4) engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.96 The court disbarred him based on the Standards; the court mentioned
no mitigating factors.97
In the 1997 case In re Caranchini, Caranchini was charged with engaging
in unethical behavior based on her conduct in four cases.98 In the first case,
Caranchini’s unethical behavior resulted largely from a lack of diligence; she
failed to properly investigate her client’s claim before filing the complaint, and
the district court dismissed her client’s case on summary judgment.99 The Supreme Court of Missouri found that she violated four Missouri Rules: (1) bringing a frivolous claim, (2) failing to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation, (3) violating or attempting to violate the Missouri Rules, and (4) engaging
in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.100
In the second case, Caranchini tried using a forged document to support
her client’s claim and continued using it after she learned of its forgery.101 The
court concluded she: (1) pursued a frivolous claim, (2) failed to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation, (3) knowingly offered evidence she knew to
be false, (4) engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, and (5) engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.102
Caranchini in the third case made unsupported allegations, offered affirmative misrepresentations, and withheld material evidence.103 Specifically,
Caranchini affirmatively misrepresented the date she learned that a potential
party’s residence had changed, and she intentionally failed to disclose a significant witness’s name, hoping to surprise the opposition at trial.104 She also
purposely misrepresented her ability to connect several witnesses to her client,
after the court instructed Caranchini that the witnesses could only testify if they
were adequately connected to Caranchini’s client.105 The court held she: (1)
pursued a frivolous claim, (2) failed to take reasonable measures to expedite
litigation, (3) knowingly made a false statement to the tribunal, (4) unlawfully
obstructed another party’s access to evidence, (5) failed to diligently attempt

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id. at 230.
Id. at 231.
In re Caranchini, 956 S.W.2d 910, 914–15 (Mo. 1997) (en banc).
Id. at 915.
Id. at 916.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 917–18.
Id. at 917.
Id. at 917–18.
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to comply with discovery requests, and (6) engaged in conduct prejudicial to
the administration of justice.106
In the fourth case, Caranchini filed a frivolous motion for sanctions
against opposing counsel and pursued a frivolous appeal.107 The court again
found that she: (1) pursued a frivolous claim, (2) failed to take reasonable steps
to expedite litigation, and (3) engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.108
The court did not reference any mitigating factors and strictly followed
precedent and the Standards in disbarring Caranchini because she “intentionally submitted a false document, intentionally made false statements, and intentionally withheld material information.”109 The court explained, “This misconduct is an affront to the fundamental and indispensable principle that a lawyer must proceed with absolute candor towards the tribunal. In the absence of
that candor, the legal system cannot properly function.”110
In the case In re Carey, the court in 2002 found that Carey and Danis
“violated two of the most fundamental principles of our [legal] profession, loyalty to the client and honesty to the bench.”111 A former client sued Carey and
Danis for breach of fiduciary duty after both lawyers knowingly failed to produce forty-two documents requested multiple times in interrogatories.112 The
two attorneys established the following mitigating factors: no prior disciplinary
action, several attorneys attested to their reputations for loyalty to the client
and honesty to the bench, participation in charities and pro bono work, and the
satisfaction of an $850,000 judgment against them.113 Because of these mitigating factors, the court indefinitely suspended, rather than disbarring, Carey
and Danis.114
Considering the precedent above, it appears the Supreme Court of Missouri takes the duty of honesty to the tribunal quite seriously. The court disbarred three of the six offending attorneys, while the lightest punishment the
court doled out was a six-month suspension.115 The court mentioned several
mitigating factors in deciding not to disbar Mr. Ver Dught, Mr. Carey, and Mr.

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id. at 918.
Id.
Id. at 919.
Id. at 919–20.
In re Carey, 89 S.W.3d 477, 503 (Mo. 2002) (en banc).
Id. at 489.
Id. at 503.
Id. at 504.
In re Ver Dught, 825 S.W.2d 847, 851 (Mo. 1992) (en banc) (attorney suspended for six months); In re Oberhellmann, 873 S.W.2d 851, 856 (Mo. 1994) (en
banc) (attorney disbarred); In re Storment, 873 S.W.2d 227, 231 (Mo. 1994) (en banc)
(attorney disbarred); Caranchini, 956 S.W.2d at 919 (attorney disbarred); Carey, 89
S.W.3d at 504 (both attorneys suspended indefinitely).
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Danis.116 The case law suggests the court has little patience for attorneys who
intentionally deceive the tribunal, and absent several mitigating factors, the
court disbars – as the Standards prescribe – those attorneys who intentionally
deceive the tribunal. The presence or absence of mitigating evidence seems to
be the crux of the court’s punishment in reprimanding lawyers who knowingly
present false evidence, at least in the cases cited in Krigel.

IV. INSTANT DECISION
In re Krigel required the Supreme Court of Missouri to weigh Krigel’s
extensive past without disciplinary action against his violation of one of a lawyer’s most serious ethical duties – candor toward the tribunal. Judge George
W. Draper’s majority opinion, joined by Judges Stith and Russell, concluded
that disbarment was inappropriate given Krigel’s extensive past without disciplinary action.117 The court held that Krigel violated Rules 4-3.3(a)(3), 44.1(a), 4-4.4(a), and 4-8.4(d) and stayed his suspension, subject to Krigel completing two years’ probation.118
Chief Justice Patricia Breckenridge filed an opinion concurring with the
court’s discipline, but she dissented from the finding that Krigel violated Rule
4-4.4(a).119 This Note does not discuss Chief Justice Breckenridge’s opinion
because she concurred in the discipline; instead, it primarily analyzes Krigel’s
violation of 4-3.3(a)(3) and the court’s decision to spare Krigel’s law license.
Believing Krigel should have been disbarred, Judge Zel M. Fischer dissented;
Judges Wilson and Teitelman joined the dissenting opinion.120

A. The Majority
Because the court reviewed the evidence de novo, it began by determining
what rules Krigel violated.121 The court found that Krigel offered evidence he
knew to be false, violating Rule 4-3.3(a)(3), when he questioned Birth Mother
at the adoption hearing.122 Specifically, Krigel knew Birth Father did not consent to adoption and was unaware of the child’s birth, but he helped Birth
Mother convince the court that Birth Father had simply failed to exercise his

116. Ver Dught, 825 S.W.2d at 851 (finding in mitigation that Ver Dught contributed to his profession, community, and church, and that he possessed a “good” reputation in the community); Carey, 89 S.W.3d at 503 (citing the following mitigating factors: no prior disciplinary action, several attorneys attested to their reputations for loyalty to the client and honesty to the bench, participation in charities and pro bono work,
and the satisfaction of an $850,000 judgment against them).
117. In re Krigel, 480 S.W.3d 294, 302 (Mo. 2016) (en banc).
118. See generally id. at 296.
119. Id. at 302–03 (Breckenridge, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
120. Id. at 306 (Fischer, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 299 (majority opinion).
122. Id.
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parental rights.123 Birth Mother additionally testified that Birth Father was able
to continually communicate with her, which Krigel knew was false.124 The
majority concluded “Krigel’s representation to the trial court via his questioning, by permitting false and misleading testimony to be presented, was designed to portray the false impression that Birth Father was not interested in
the child or in asserting his parental rights.”125
The court found that Krigel violated Rule 4-4.1(a), which bars a lawyer
from knowingly making a false statement of material fact to a third person,
when he told Zimmerman the child would not be adopted without Birth Father’s consent.126
Next, the court held that Krigel used means having no substantial purpose
other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, violating Rule 44.4(a).127 Krigel actively withheld information from Birth Father and “pursued
a course of action that disregarded the parental rights of Birth Father and the
best interests of the child in remaining with a natural parent.”128
Lastly, the court held that Krigel violated Rule 4-8.4(d) and engaged in
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in submitting a Petition to
Approve, Consent, and Transfer of Custody, declaring Birth Mother knew of
no one else claiming to have custodial or visitation rights.129 The court found
that statement untrue and concluded Krigel “thwarted” Birth Father’s opportunity to assert his parental rights.130
The court shifted to discipline and noted at the outset that it relies on the
Standards when imposing sanctions.131 It highlighted four factors the court
generally considers: (1) duty violated, (2) lawyer’s mental state, (3) potential
or actual injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct, and (4) aggravating and
mitigating factors.132 The court focused on the final factor, listing multiple
offenses and a failure to grasp the severity of the charges as aggravating factors.133 It failed to mention Krigel’s extensive legal experience as an aggravating factor.134 The court noted in mitigation Krigel’s more than thirty years of
practice without disciplinary action.135

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 299–300.
Id. at 300.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 300–01.
Id. at 301. This Note does not discuss the recommended sanctions for the other
offenses at issue because the Rule 4-3.3(a) violation is the most serious, and the court
must issue punishment consistent with the offender’s most serious violation.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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The court acknowledged that Krigel’s punishment should be consistent
with that of his most egregious violation.136 It concluded that his most egregious violation was making a false statement to, and withholding material information from, the tribunal, for which disbarment is usually the appropriate
sanction.137 After noting that disbarment is reserved for “clear cases of gross
misconduct” where the lawyer is unfit to continue practicing law, the court
distinguished In re Oberhellmann.138 The court found the analogy of Krigel’s
conduct to Oberhellmann inapposite because Oberhellmann committed misconduct in two separate cases.139 Considering a lesser degree of punishment,
the court stated that suspension might be appropriate when the lawyer “merely
knows of the misrepresentation” or “knows that a false statement is being submitted to a court and takes no remedial action.”140
The court denied Krigel’s request that no sanction be imposed because
“Krigel’s conduct in this matter was not passive; he knew material information
was withheld from the trial court, and he took no remedial action during any of
the proceedings.”141 The court found disbarment inappropriate because “Krigel has never been disciplined by this [c]ourt and has specialized in this area
of law for more than thirty years without complaint.”142 Instead, the court suspended Krigel for six months and stayed its execution pending completion of
two years’ probation.143

B. The Dissent
Judge Zel M. Fischer, joined by Judges Wilson and Teitelman, dissented.144 The dissent opened with a quote of the oath every lawyer licensed
to practice in Missouri must take: “That I will never seek to mislead the judge
or jury by any artifice or false statement of fact or law[.]”145 Because Krigel
violated the oath, as well as several Missouri Rules, the dissent would disbar,

136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 301–02 (quoting In re Ver Dught, 825 S.W.2d 847, 851 (Mo. 1992) (en

banc)).
139. Id. (“In Oberhellmann, the attorney’s misrepresentations were made in two
separate and unrelated cases. In one case, the attorney affirmatively instructed his client
to perjure herself on the witness stand, and in the other case, the attorney forged his
former legal associate’s signature on a document submitted to the court. The analogy
of Krigel’s conduct to Oberhellmann is inapposite.”).
140. Id. at 302 (first quoting In re Caranchini, 956 S.W.2d 910, 919 (Mo. 1997) (en
banc); and then quoting In re Oberhellmann, 873 S.W.2d 851, 856 (Mo. 1994) (en
banc)).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 306 (Fischer, J., dissenting).
145. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted).
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or at a minimum, suspend Krigel indefinitely, without leave to reapply for six
months.146
Unlike the majority, the dissent allowed the circuit court’s judgment removing the child from the adoptive parents and placing it with the Birth Father
to inform its opinion.147 The dissent quoted the beginning of the circuit court’s
judgment: “The facts of this case shock the justice system that the people of
Missouri enjoy. The [c]ourt finds the actions of officers of this [c]ourt [referring to Krigel] to be at minimum disturbing to the administration of justice.”148
The dissent also highlighted the circuit court’s finding that Krigel received
from the adoptive parents $22,000 for “a minimal role in the litigation.”149
The dissent relied on precedent in concluding Rule 4-3.3(a) violations
have typically resulted in disbarment or indefinite suspension.150 When imposing sanctions in Oberhellman, the court stated, “Disbarment is appropriate
when a lawyer, with the intent to deceive a court, makes a false statement or
submits a false document to a court.”151 The dissent found this controlling and
attacked the majority for “turn[ing] an ‘about face’ from this precedent in
merely suspending Krigel, staying the suspension, and permitting Krigel to
continue to practice on probation.”152

V. COMMENT
This Part compares the majority opinion to the precedent the court cited
and argues the majority diverged from this precedent. Next, it offers an alternative analysis of how Krigel’s conduct should be examined under the Standards. Lastly, this Part argues the majority’s punishment fails to achieve what
it considers to be the two main purposes of punishment.

A. The Majority Diverged from Precedent
The court, in establishing the legal framework, noted, “Generally, ‘when
an attorney, with an intent to deceive the court, submits a false document,
makes a false statement, or withholds material information, disbarment is the
appropriate sanction.’”153 At first blush, Krigel seems to be a prime candidate
for disbarment because he knowingly presented false evidence with the intent
146. Id.
147. Id. at 309–10.
148. Id. at 309 (third alteration in original) (emphasis added) (internal quotations

omitted).
149. Id. at 310 (internal quotations omitted).
150. Id. (citing In re Carey, 89 S.W.3d 477 (Mo. 2002) (en banc); In re Caranchini,
956 S.W.2d 910 (Mo. 1997) (en banc); and In re Storment, 873 S.W.2d 227 (Mo. 1997)
(en banc)).
151. In re Oberhellmann, 873 S.W.2d 851, 856 (Mo. 1994) (en banc) (emphasis
added).
152. Krigel, 480 S.W.3d at 311 (Fischer, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 301 (majority opinion) (quoting Caranchini, 956 S.W.2d at 919).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

15

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 10

184

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

to deceive the court.154 Yet the court distinguished Krigel’s conduct from one
who intends to deceive the court, finding controlling the Standard that governs
the conduct of an attorney who merely knows of the misrepresentation.155 But
in doing so, the court failed to distinguish Krigel’s conduct from Oberhellman,
Storment, and Caranchini, who were all disbarred because of their intention to
deceive the court.156
Oberhellmann instructed his client to perjure herself and also offered a
forged document.157 Although the record is absent of any evidence that Krigel
instructed Birth Mother to lie under oath, the court found Krigel and Birth
Mother employed a passive strategy to keep Birth Father in the dark.158 Krigel
then elicited testimony whereby Birth Mother perjured herself in the hearing to
terminate her parental rights.159 Krigel and Birth Mother obviously concocted
a plan to deceive Birth Father, and the court, from the outset. The majority
acknowledged this in concluding that Krigel violated Rule 4-3.3(a)(3): “Krigel’s representation to the trial court via his questioning, by permitting false
and misleading testimony to be presented, was designed to portray the false
impression that Birth Father was not interested in the child or in asserting his
parental rights.”160 Therefore, the majority’s conclusion that the Standard governing conduct where a lawyer merely knows of the misrepresentation contradicts its earlier analysis of Krigel’s conduct.
In distinguishing Krigel’s conduct from Oberhellmann’s, the majority
seemed to mischaracterize the dissent’s use of Oberhellman. The majority explained, “The dissent believes that Krigel should be disbarred from the practice
of law, comparing Krigel’s conduct to that of the attorney in In re Oberhellmann.”161 The majority reasoned that the comparison between Krigel’s conduct and Oberhellmann was “inapposite” because Oberhellmann’s misrepresentations were made in two separate cases.162 But the dissent merely recited
Oberhellmann to provide the legal background; its real purpose in using Oberhellmann was to establish the legal standard. The dissent’s block quotation of
the reasoning in Oberhellmann affirmed this.163 Judge Fischer used Oberhellmann to stand for the proposition that a lawyer should be disbarred if he, with
154. See id. at 301–02.
155. Id. at 302 (emphasis added) (“Turning to [the] ABA Standards, this [c]ourt

finds the appropriate recommended range of discipline to be reflected in ABA Standard
6.12[, which notes when suspension, not disbarment, is appropriate].”).
156. See generally id.
157. In re Oberhellmann, 873 S.W.2d 851, 853, 855 (Mo. 1994) (en banc).
158. Krigel, 480 S.W.3d at 297–98.
159. Id. at 298 (“In response to a question by Krigel, Birth Mother agreed that Birth
Father ‘had been consulted at length about the matter.’ Birth Mother also agreed when
Krigel asked ‘even though you’ve talked to him and his family at some length, he has
not stepped forward since the birth of the child claiming any rights to the child.’”).
160. Id. at 299.
161. Id. at 301.
162. Id. at 301–02.
163. The dissent quoted the following from Oberhellmann:
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the intent to deceive the court, makes a false statement to the court. It is irrelevant that Krigel’s conduct failed to rise to the level of Oberhellmann’s; the
dispositive fact is Krigel knowingly offered false evidence and intentionally
asked Birth Mother questions to elicit that false evidence.
Next, Storment counseled his client to testify falsely and asked questions
during direct examination designed to elicit the false testimony.164 The court
concluded suspension was not appropriate because “Storment’s active role
transcends failure to remedy.”165 So the court disbarred him.166 In determining
Krigel’s punishment, the majority highlighted that “Krigel’s conduct in this
matter was not passive; he knew material information was withheld from the
trial court, and he took no remedial action during any of the proceedings.”167
But the court did not go so far as to characterize Krigel’s conduct as active,
even though he asked questions to elicit false testimony, which is analogous to
Storment’s conduct that the court considered “active.”168
Lastly, Caranchini, among other things, intentionally submitted a forged
document, intentionally made false statements, and intentionally withheld material information.169 The court in disbarring Caranchini stated its decision
“must turn on the precedent that when an attorney, with an intent to deceive
the court, submits a false document, makes a false statement, or withholds material information, disbarment is the appropriate sanction.”170 Although Krigel
did not submit a false document or make a false oral statement, the majority
concluded his questioning at the paternity hearing “omitted essential information.”171 Further, Krigel signed the Petition to Approve, Consent, and
Transfer of Custody, which stated Birth Mother was unaware of any other person asserting a custodial claim over the child; of course, Birth Mother knew
Birth Father asserted custody over the child.172 It is worth pointing out that the

In cases of false statements, fraud, or misrepresentation, this [c]ourt issues reprimands only if the lawyer is merely negligent in determining whether statements or documents are false. Respondent was more than negligent; therefore,
public reprimand is not appropriate. Nor is suspension appropriate. Suspension
is appropriate only if a lawyer knows that a false statement is being submitted
to a court and takes no remedial action. Disbarment is the appropriate sanction
for respondent. Disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer, with the intent to
deceive a court, makes a false statement or submits a false document to a court.

Id. at 311 (Fischer, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Oberhellmann, 873 S.W.2d 851, 856,
(Mo. 1994) (en banc)).
164. In re Storment, 873 S.W.2d 227, 229–30 (Mo. 1994) (en banc).
165. Id. at 231.
166. Id.
167. Krigel, 480 S.W.3d at 302.
168. Id. at 298; Storment, 873 S.W.2d at 231.
169. In re Caranchini, 956 S.W.2d 910, 919 (Mo. 1997) (en banc).
170. Id.
171. Krigel, 480 S.W.3d at 299.
172. Id. at 300.
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disbarment standard does not require an attorney to submit a false document,
make a false statement, and withhold material information. The standard is
disjunctive. Disbarment is appropriate if an attorney does any one of those
things with the intent to deceive the court.

B. The Majority Improperly Weighed the Standards
The court highlighted four factors it generally considers when determining what sanction to impose: (1) “the duty violated;” (2) “the lawyer’s mental
state;” (3) “the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct;
and” (4) “the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.”173 The majority
mostly analyzed aggravating and mitigating factors – consistent with the pattern identified in Part III.C – but this Part argues that all four factors favor
disbarring Krigel.
First, the court analyzes the duty violated. The majority acknowledged
Krigel’s most serious act of misconduct was his lack of candor to the tribunal.174 Duties to the tribunal are among lawyers’ most important ethical obligations, and some scholars believe the duty of candor is even more important
than lawyers’ duties to their clients.175 The Supreme Court of Missouri has
characterized the duty of candor to the tribunal as “fundamental and indispensable” and claimed that the legal system could not function properly without
it.176 The commentary accompanying the Standards reiterates this, instructing
that those who, with the intent to deceive the court, make a false statement or
improperly withhold information “violate the most fundamental duty of an officer of the court.”177 The circuit court believed Krigel’s actions “shock[ed]
the justice system,” and “at [a] minimum disturb[ed] . . . the administration of
justice.”178 Because Krigel violated what some consider his most important
obligation, this factor cuts toward disbarment.
Second, the court determines the lawyer’s mental state. Under the Standards, after an attorney makes false statements or withholds material information, the severity of punishment hinges on his mental state. If the lawyer
does these things with the intent to deceive the court, then disbarment is appropriate.179 But if the attorney merely knows these things are happening and fails
173. Id. at 301.
174. Id.
175. John M. Burman, Lawyers’ Duties to Tribunals: Part II – Candor, WYO.

LAW., Dec. 2011, at 46 (“Having determined that a lawyer’s duties to tribunals have
priority over all other duties only begins the inquiry.”).
176. In re Caranchini, 956 S.W.2d 910, 919–20 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (“This misconduct is an affront to the fundamental and indispensable principle that a lawyer must
proceed with absolute candor towards the tribunal. In the absence of that candor, the
legal system cannot properly function.”).
177. MODEL STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 6.11 cmt. (AM. BAR
ASS’N 1986).
178. Krigel, 480 S.W.3d at 309 (Fischer, J., dissenting).
179. MODEL STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 6.11.
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to remedy them, then suspension will suffice.180 Krigel clearly intended to deceive the court in eliciting false testimony from Birth Mother and withholding
material information. Implicit in the majority’s conclusion that the Standard
governing suspension controlled was its inference that Krigel merely knew of
the misrepresentations and did not intend to deceive the court.181 Yet that conclusion is inconsistent with the majority’s conclusion that “Krigel’s questioning of Birth Mother at that hearing was designed to mislead the trial court as to
the actual circumstances between Birth Mother and Birth Father.”182 Because
Krigel intended to deceive the court, this factor cuts toward disbarment.
Third, the court examines the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct. The majority failed to mention this factor, but the dissent
articulated the situation as “a fraud on the circuit court that resulted in a father
not receiving custody of his child in excess of a year, and Krigel receiving
$22,000 for a minimal role in the litigation.”183 It is easy for lawyers and law
students to become desensitized to egregious facts as they are commonplace in
the practice and study of law. But a father could not see or hold his child for
more than one year because of Krigel’s intentional, highly calculated, conduct.
Further, it seems as though the justice system is practically rewarding Krigel
for intentionally deceiving the court – yes, he is on probation, but he may nonetheless continue to practice law, and he profited from his appalling conduct.
This amounts to significant harm that is arguably more serious – as it deals
with parental custody – than the cases cited by the majority. This factor weighs
in favor of disbarment.
Fourth, the court determines any aggravating and mitigating factors. The
majority devoted significant discussion to this factor. The court cited in aggravation that Krigel committed multiple offenses and failed to understand the
severity of the charges.184 In mitigation, the majority noted that Krigel has
been practicing for more than thirty years with no prior disciplinary history.185
The crux of the court’s analysis was this lone mitigation factor: “Considering
Krigel has never been disciplined by this [c]ourt and has specialized in this area

180. Id. at 6.12.
181. Krigel, 480 S.W.3d at 302 (“A lesser sanction of suspension may be appropri-

ate in cases when ‘the attorney merely knows of the misrepresentation. . . .’ ‘Suspension is appropriate only if a lawyer knows that a false statement is being submitted to a
court and takes no remedial action.’ Turning to [the] ABA Standards, this [c]ourt finds
the appropriate recommended range of discipline to be reflected in ABA Standard
6.12.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting In re Caranchini, 956
S.W.2d 910, 919 (Mo. 1997) (en banc); and then quoting In re Oberhellmann, 873
S.W.2d 851, 856 (Mo. 1994) (en banc))).
182. Id. at 299 (emphasis added).
183. Id. at 310 (Fischer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).
184. Id. at 301 (majority opinion).
185. Id.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

19

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 10

188

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

of law for more than thirty years without complaint, disbarment is an inappropriate sanction.”186 But the court failed to acknowledge that Krigel’s vast experience is also an aggravating factor – the Standards clearly list “substantial
experience in the practice of law” as an aggravating factor.187 The logic behind
this aggravating factor is that experienced lawyers should know better than to
engage in this conduct, while inexperienced lawyers might act unethically because of youth and inexperience.188 The majority cited Krigel’s substantial
experience in the practice of law three separate times as a mitigating factor,189
but it failed to cite Krigel’s more than thirty years’ experience specializing in
adoption law as an aggravating factor. Every lawyer, even a first-year associate, should know not to intentionally deceive the tribunal. But a lawyer with
more than thirty years’ experience in adoption law should be intimately aware
of the negative repercussions that follow from deceiving a court in adoption
proceedings.
It will always be the case that an experienced lawyer with no prior violations may be viewed one of two ways: (1) a lawyer who deserves a break because of his long record of good behavior, or (2) a lawyer who – based on his
experience – should have known better and should be punished more severely
because the violation was not the result of inexperience. This invites judges to
arbitrarily choose whether a long record with no ethical violations mitigates or
aggravates the violation. Not only does this case involve violating a lawyer’s
most fundamental duty, but this duty was violated by a lawyer who has substantial experience. He knew better. In sum, there is one mitigating factor,
which also doubles as an aggravating factor, weighed against three aggravating
factors – this balancing favors disbarment.

C. The Majority’s Punishment Does Not Serve What It Considers the
Two Primary Purposes of Punishment
The majority considered protecting the public and maintaining the integrity of the profession as the twin purposes of punishing lawyers who violate
the ethics rules.190 The court noted that it may accomplish these purposes di-

186. Id. at 302.
187. MODEL STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 9.22 (AM. BAR ASS’N

1986).
188. 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 68 (2016) (“Substantial experience is
deemed to be an aggravating factor in determining a sanction for attorney misconduct,
while lack of experience as a lawyer is considered to be a mitigating factor; the distinction is made in recognition of the fact that a youthful and inexperienced attorney may
have engaged in misconduct as a result of inexperience rather than as a result of deliberate calculation.”).
189. Krigel, 480 S.W.3d at 297, 301, 302.
190. Id. at 301.
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rectly, by removing a lawyer from the practice of law, and indirectly, by ordering sanctions that deter others from engaging in similar conduct.191 The majority’s decision to stay Krigel’s six-month suspension fails to accomplish either punishment purpose. First, the majority does not protect the public because Krigel – even after eliciting false testimony and withholding material
information – is still practicing law. Krigel may continue to practice adoption
law so long as he does not violate the terms of his two-year probationary period.192 It is unlikely that the probationary terms will change the nature of Krigel’s practice. It should be relatively easy for Krigel to satisfy the terms. The
majority listed as an aggravating factor that Krigel failed to appreciate the severity of his conduct, which implies he might engage in this behavior again.
Under the majority’s decision, Krigel has the opportunity to do so at any time.
Second, the majority’s punishment does not protect the integrity of the
profession. This decision tells lawyers if they have a long history of practicing
law with no prior ethical violations, they will be treated leniently, even if they
violate the lawyer’s most fundamental duty. Instead of deterring other lawyers
from engaging in such conduct, the majority’s decision implies that it is acceptable to bend the rules so long as the lawyer is experienced and well behaved to date. There will be repercussions, such as probation, if these rules are
bent, but these repercussions will not keep experienced lawyers with no disciplinary history from practicing law.
Third, because this decision strays from precedent, it leaves practitioners
wondering what will happen in a similar case. Is Krigel an outlier, or is the
Supreme Court of Missouri moving toward a more lenient treatment of lawyers
who violate the duty of candor toward the tribunal? This decision tells experienced lawyers they may intentionally deceive the tribunal and continue to practice law if it is their first documented misstep. That message undermines the
integrity of the legal profession and the public’s trust in lawyers. Hopefully
Krigel is an outlier, rather than the turn of the ethical tide in Missouri.

VI. CONCLUSION
Due to the nature of the profession, lawyers must obey strict ethical obligations. No obligation is more important than the duty of candor to the tribunal. After all, how will our legal system function properly if lawyers fail to

191. Id.
192. Id. at 302. The terms of Krigel’s probation require him to: (1) submit quarterly

reports to his probation monitor, (2) comply with the Missouri Rules, (3) attend the
Solo & Small Firm Conference of The Missouri Bar (which may count toward his fifteen-hour CLE requirement), (4) obtain malpractice insurance, (5) notify the CDC of
any change of employment, (6) report the details of any client trust accounts, (7) provide audits of the client trust accounts, (8) pay for probation participation, and (9) comply with terms one through eight or face a potential six-month suspension of his law
license. See generally Terms and Conditions of Probation at 1–7, In re Krigel, 480
S.W.3d 294 (Mo. 2016) (en banc).
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exercise honesty and trustworthiness before the court? Krigel violated this fundamental ethical duty – yet the Supreme Court of Missouri stayed the execution
of his six-month suspension. In doing so, the majority departed from precedent
and misapplied the Standards. The decision in this case shows one of two
things: (1) the Supreme Court of Missouri judges decide disciplinary cases
based on their subjective beliefs of what is proper, regardless of precedent, or
(2) Missouri is headed in a more lenient direction when it comes to punishing
lawyers who violate ethical obligations. Hopefully the court corrects this misstep and replaces subjective manipulation of the Standards with a stricter adherence to its own precedent.
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